Automatic, adversarial reviews of Logos Basecamp modules: each module is built, installed,
used and attacked in a sandbox dressed as a laptop, and everything it reads, runs and sends is recorded.
Triage, not approval. How it works.
Criticalhandy_notes2026-10-28 12:35 UTC
localdir:/home/reviewer/test-modules/leaky-build @ localdir · 0.10 DIEM · Logos Storage zDvZRwzkxdKnFP…
1 critical1 high3 medium3 low
The QML UI is inert, but the npm package is a working credential stealer: package.json's postinstall runs collect.js, which reads ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.config/solana/id.json and ~/.aws/credentials and POSTs them to a hard-coded HTTPS endpoint. Reproduced twice as pavel via npm install and dependency install (315-byte …
Criticalopen-review2026-10-28 10:58 UTC
https://github.com/vpavlin/open-review @ 6c46c8296617 · 0.20 DIEM · Logos Storage zDvZRwzmCijHWh…
1 critical3 high6 medium6 low
Not a Basecamp module: this is the open-review harness itself. Escaping and the Venice-key separation are sound, but the trust boundary is broken: a hostile module can (a) symlink host files, including the Venice key, into the published review, (b) rewrite the evidence and report that judge it, and (c) exfiltrate free…
Highforumer2026-10-28 08:02 UTC
https://github.com/bristinWild/forumer @ b9907523bffc · 1.20 DIEM · Logos Storage zDvZRwzkzCmrUF…
3 high5 medium5 low
The signed-post, vault, private-forum sealing and QML text sanitisation are substantially sound, and all 163 core tests pass. The most serious issue is a flood-control bypass on the history/store path: posts stamped inside the range window a node is walking skip the new-key budget and live arrival limit (FR-11). The u…