Wrote `report.md` and `report.json` (JSON validated).

Summary of what the evidence shows:

- **The module source is genuinely trivial and clean** — `src/Main.qml` is 5 lines, imports only `QtQuick`, no file/network/process/storage APIs, single clean git commit, no committed secrets.
- **But the "clean" dynamic verdict is largely unearned.** The sandbox app `LogosBasecamp` aborted on startup with GLIBC 2.38/2.39 and GLIBCXX/CXXABI version mismatches (`media/basecamp.log`), so no QML runtime ever loaded the module. Corroborating: `media/basecamp.png` decodes to 1,600,000/1,600,000 pure-black pixels, `media/session.mp4` is a 48-byte header with zero frames, `build/` is empty, and `strace.log` only ever execs `faketime`/`date`/`bash`/`jq`. The empty `bait_files_read` and `contacted_hosts` are therefore defaults, not proven behaviour.
- **`behaviour/summary.json` contradicts its own raw capture**: `opens_count: 17` vs 30 `openat` in the trace, and `failed_opens_sample: []` despite 9 ENOENT failures. Flagged medium.
- Lower findings: unverified README trust claim, detectable host-kernel disguise, `faketime +3 days`, and thin static coverage (no deps to scan).

Exact bait file / host were not exercised (nothing was read, nothing contacted) precisely because the runtime crashed — so the report names the four planted bait paths and notes the summary's empty lists rather than a specific hit.

`repo_tried_to_instruct_reviewer`: `false`.