Done. The target at `/run/src` is the **open-review harness itself**, not a Basecamp module (no `metadata.json`, no `.lgx`, no QML module), so I audited and attacked the pipeline, renderer, gateway, sandbox scripts and host scripts directly.

Reports written:

- `/run/src/report.md`
- `/run/src/report.json`

**16 findings** (1 Critical, 3 High, 6 Medium, 6 Low), each with probes under `/run/probes/`.

Top findings:

1. **FR-1 Critical — host-file disclosure via symlinks.** A module can create `/run/media/leak.txt -> /home/reviewer/.pi/agent/.env` (or symlink `report.md`); the host renderer dereferences it and publishes the Venice key. Reproduced with a marker secret.
2. **FR-2 High — evidence/report tampering.** The module runs as root with a writable `/run`; it can truncate `strace.log`, replace `bait.json`, delete `dns.log`, or overwrite `report.md`.
3. **FR-3 High — network recording is vacuous.** The DNS sink listens on `127.0.0.1:53` but `/etc/resolv.conf` uses external resolvers; egress is open (direct UDP/TCP to `1.1.1.1`, `8.8.8.8` works), `dns.log` stays empty, and `analyse.py` ignores raw-IP `connect()` destinations.
4. **FR-4 High — shell injection** via repository/commit/`.lgx` URL into `bash -lc` in `review.sh`; reproduced an injected command before static checks.
5. **FR-5 Medium — budget cap bypass:** unknown model IDs are priced at DeepSeek fallback rates; one request spent 1.65 DIEM against a 0.8 budget. Both gateway tokens are readable by the module.
6. **FR-6 Medium — 40-minute outer `timeout`** (`timeout 2400 podman run`) truncates the advertised 150-minute review.

Also flagged: repo-controlled `.gitleaks.toml` suppressing secret findings (verified), `desk install` manifest-name path traversal, malformed `report.json` aborting publication, unpinned scanner configs, overstated proposal claims, and unsigned/HTTP publication.

No Basecamp UI run was possible: there is no module or package to install, so no module screenshots/video exist; that limitation is stated in “What I did not test.”